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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. Section 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1992) which 
provides: "The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over, 
(i)appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property 
division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity . . . ." 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering the 
Husband to maintain his Civil Service Survivor Benefits and life 
insurance in favor of the Wife where the record reflected a clear 
and uncontroverted agreement that he would do so? The standard of 
review requires this court to uphold the trial court order absent 
a showing of an abuse of discretion. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 
P.2d 57, 61 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by modifying the 
decree of divorce to correct a clerical error omitting reference to 
maintenance of Husband's life insurance policy/survivor benefits? 
The standard of review requires the court to uphold the trial court 
absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 
P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984). 
3. Did the trial court properly order the Husband to 
maintain a Civil Service Survivor Benefits and life insurance 
policy naming the Wife as the beneficiary? The standard of review 
requires the court to uphold the trial court absent a showing of an 
abuse of discretion. Whitehead v. Whitehead. 836 P. 2d 814, 816 
(Utah App. 1992) . 
4. Wife should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs of 
court in defending this appeal. 
2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(a): 
Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, 
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court at any time of its own initiative or on the 
motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the 
court orders. 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION Rule 4-501(3)(a)-
Hearings. (a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered 
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, or 
requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) 
. . • below, (b) In cases where the granting of a motion 
would dispose of the action or any issues in the action 
on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of 
filing the principal memorandum in support of or in 
opposition to a motion may file a written request for a 
hearing. (c) Such request shall be granted unless the 
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the 
motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or 
set of issues governing the granting or denial of the 
motion has been authoritatively decided. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties tried this divorce case before Judge Richard H. 
Moffat in the Third District Court for Tooele County on November 
13, 1991. The parties had been married in 1960, and were ending a 
marriage of over 30 (thirty) years. The marriage was a traditional 
marriage in which the Husband was the wage earner and the Defendant 
was a homemaker. During the trial Verna Labadie, ("Wife"), 
testified that she desired David Labadie ("Husband) to maintain his 
life insurance policy with her as the beneficiary. When asked, 
Husband indicated he had no objection to Wife's wishes. When Judge 
Moffat entered the divorce Wife's counsel reminded Judge Moffat of 
the agreement between the parties to maintain the life insurance 
policy. Judge Moffat acknowledged this agreement. Husband's 
counsel then asked to address attorneys' fees and did not return to 
a discussion of the life insurance issue. Husband's counsel 
drafted the final decree, which was submitted to Wife's counsel for 
approval as to form and entered by Judge Moffat on December 11, 
1992. 
Shortly after Judge Moffat entered the order Wife's counsel 
discovered that Husband's counsel omitted the provision ordering 
Husband to maintain his life insurance policy. Wife's counsel 
notified Husband's counsel and requested the preparation of an 
amended decree including the Survivor Benefits provision. Husband 
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did not respond. Wife then filed a motion to amend the decree 
pursuant to the Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501. 
Wife based this motion on UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(a) which allows for 
correction of clerical mistakes in judicial orders. Neither party 
sought a hearing on the motion. Judge David S. Young found Wife's 
request to be consistent with the stipulation the parties made in 
court and granted Wife's motion on October 28, 1993. Husband 
sought a hearing for reconsideration of Judge Young's motion which 
the court denied. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Husband's agreement to maintain his life insurance policy in 
favor of the Wife is clear and uncontroverted in the record and 
supports Judge Young's order. Furthermore, the court did not abuse 
its discretion by denying Husband's motion for a hearing for 
reconsideration where the court authoritatively decided the 
dispositive issue. 
The court did not violate res judicata principles by granting 
Wife's motion to amend the decree. Rather, the court complied with 
the requirements of UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(a) which allows the court to 
correct clerical errors. 
Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering 
the Husband to maintain his life insurance policy where the parties 
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stipulated that Husband would do so and the order is consistent 
with available precedent. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING 
TO PROVIDE DETAILED FINDINGS AND GRANT A HEARING ON 
HUSBAND'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
A. The Court Need Not Enter Detailed Findings Where 
the Record is Clear and Uncontroverted. 
The trial court's decision to amend the decree of divorce 
without a detailed statement of findings and reasons was not an 
abuse of discretion. Wife concedes that findings are required when 
a court modifies a divorce decree based on a change of 
circumstances. Nonetheless, findings are not necessary when the 
court bases its order on the clear facts in the record. The Utah 
Court of Appeals in Whitehouse stated, "[T]he trial court must make 
findings on all material issues, . . . unless the facts in the 
record are clear, uncontroverted and only support the judgment." 
790 P.2d at 61 (emphasis added) (citing Acton v. J.B. Deliran. 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987), and Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)) . 
In Whitehouse, the plaintiff sought to amend a decree of 
divorce because of a change of circumstances. Principally, the 
plaintiff sought to setoff the defendant's interest in the 
6 
plaintiff's retirement account against the plaintiff's interest in 
the marital home. The plaintiff also sought to end his alimony and 
child support payments. The defendant countered, asking the court 
for an immediate payment of her share of the retirement benefits. 
The court granted the plaintiff's request, effectively denying the 
defendant's request. 790 P. 2d at 59. On appeal, the court 
emphasized that the "findings of the court were directed to its 
order terminating the child support and alimony provisions of the 
decree, not to a modification of the home equity or retirement 
provisions." Id. at 61. Thus, the court found that the findings 
were not sufficiently related to the retirement and home equity 
issues and concluded that the trial court must have based its 
decision on something else. Id. at 62. 
The presence of a clear agreement in the record between 
Husband and Wife distinguishes this case from Whitehouse. During 
the trial the following exchange took place between Husband and 
Wife's counsel: 
Counsel: "Do you have any objection to maintaining 
Mrs. LaBadie as the beneficiary of your life insurance?" 
Husband: "I have to, yes." 
Counsel: "Pardon Me?" 
Husband: "Yes, I was ordered by the court to do that." 
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Counsel: "I'm talking about continuing that after 
the divorce. Do you have—?" 
Husband: "Yes." 
Counsel: "Do you have any objection to continuing 
her?" 
Husband: "No." 
(TR, p. 19). 
The exchange between Husband and Wife's counsel indicates an 
uncontroverted stipulation between the parties on the issue of 
insurance. Unlike in Whitehouse, where the trial court tried to 
base its decision on unrelated findings, the order amending the 
decree and inserting the insurance provision refers to this 
agreement and "finds the amendment to be consistent with the 
stipulation in court." Minute Entry, October 28, 1992 (emphasis 
added). Given the clarity of the record, the law does not require 
further findings in this case. 
B. Husband Was Not Entitled to a Hearing On His Motion 
to Reconsider Because the Issue of Whether the 
Parties Agreed on the Insurance Provision 
Authoritatively Decided. 
The Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the 
Husband's motion for a hearing on his motion for reconsideration. 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION Rule 4-501(3)(c) allows the 
court to deny a request for a hearing where "the court finds that 
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(a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that 
the dispositive issue or set of issues governing the granting or 
denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided." 
The Husband based his motion to reconsider on the lack of 
findings. As discussed above, extensive findings were not 
necessary in this case because of the clear expression of the 
parties agreement in the record. It logically follows, then, that 
the issues governing the denial the Husband's motion for 
reconsideration were authoritatively decided. Furthermore, 
Husband's motion to reconsider was frivolous where the judge 
expressed precise findings based on a clear agreement in his order. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
MODIFIED THE DECREE TO REFLECT THE PARTIES AGREEMENT. 
The order modifying the decree to include the life insurance 
provision corrected a clerical error excluding the provision from 
the original decree. UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(a) provides: "Clerical 
mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected 
by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders." 
In Stanaer v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co.. 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 
1983), the Utah Supreme Court explained that trial courts have 
discretion to freely correct formal errors. The Stanaer court 
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discovered an error in computing the figure used to determine 
damages for commissions due to the plaintiff. Id. at 1204. The 
Supreme Court revised the damages award upward to correct the 
mistake, and defined clerical mistakes stating: "'It is a type of 
mistake or omission mechanical in nature which is apparent on the 
record and which does not involve a legal decision or judgment by 
an attorney./fI Id. at 1206 (quoting In Re Merry Queen Transfer 
Corp., 266 F.Supp. 605, 607 (1967)). The Stanaer court further 
explained that 
"it matters little whether an error was made by the court 
clerk, the jury foreman, counsel, a party or the judge 
himself, so long as it is clearly a formal error that 
should be corrected in the interests of having judgment, 
order, or other part of the record reflect what was done 
or intended." 
Id. See also Lindsay, 680 P.2d at 402 ("The distinction between a 
judicial error and a clerical error does not depend upon who made 
it. Rather it depends on whether it was made in rendering the 
judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered." (quoting 
Richards v. Siddowav. 24 Utah 2d 314, 317, 471 P. 2d 143, 145 
119ZQ)). 
The absence of any reference to Husband's life insurance 
policy in the final decree of divorce was a clerical mistake. As 
discussed, supra, Husband agreed to maintain his life insurance 
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policy for Wife's benefit during his testimony. Furthermore, 
Husband's counsel was aware of this stipulation as evidenced by the 
following exchange at trial. 
The Court: "Well, I will grant joint divorces, 
one against the other. Did she file a counterclaim?" 
Wife's Counsel: "She did, your Honor, and she made a 
request the divorce be final in '92 and he has already 
agreed to maintain her on his survivor benefits and so 
the only other issue would be the attorneys fees issue. 
Husband's Counsel: "You are talking about life 
insurance?11 
Wife's Counsel: "Yeah. He said he was agreeable to 
maintain it." 
Husband's Counsel: "Could I address that, on attorneys 
fees?" 
The Court: "You may." 
(TR. p. 89). 
The hesitancy in Husband's counsel's request, as indicated by the 
comma in the sentence "[c]ould I address that, on attorneys fees?" 
suggests Husband's counsel did not want to talk about the life 
insurance policy at all. Instead, he was thinking about attorneys 
fees and was distracted when Wife's counsel mentioned the life 
insurance agreement. The fact that Husband's counsel then 
continued to discuss attorneys fees without any mention of life 
insurance supports this conclusion. Judge Moffat had no reason to 
11 
believe that Husband's counsel opposed the life insurance under 
these circumstances. 
The record is clear. The parties agreed on the Civil Service 
Survivor benefits and Husband's counsel was aware of the agreement. 
The order modifying the decree was correct, where, "the mistake is 
clear from the record [and] reflects no more than what the [Wife 
is] entitled to." Stanger, 669 P.2d at 1207 (citing Fay v. Harris. 
64 Ariz. 10, 164 P.2d 860 (1945)). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING 
HUSBAND TO MAINTAIN HIS LIFE INSURANCE POLICY/SURVIVOR 
BENEFITS WITH WIFE AS THE BENEFICIARY 
The order requiring Husband to maintain his life insurance 
policy or survivor benefits was within the discretion of the trial 
court and was supported by adequate legal precedent. "Trial courts 
may exercise broad discretion in divorce matters so long as the 
decision is within the confines of legal precedence." Whitehead, 
836 P.2d at 816 (citing Cumminas v. Cumminas. 821 P.2d 472, 474-74 
(Utah App. 1991); Haumont v. Haumont. 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah App. 
1990); and Rudman v. Rudman. 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah App. 1991)). 
Whether a trial court can order a spouse to maintain a life 
insurance policy for the benefit of a former spouse is a matter of 
first impression before this court. Husband cites Menor v. Menor. 
391 P.2d 473 (Colo. 1964) as the leading case on the issue. 
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Colorado, however, has since revised its statutes to allow judges 
to include provisions requiring on party to maintain a life 
insurance policy benefitting a former spouse. See In Re Marriage 
of Koktavy, 612 P. 2d 1161, 1162 (Colo. App. 1980) (holding that 
COLO. REV. STAT. Section 14-10-122(2) (1973) changed prior law to 
allow the court to order maintenance of life insurance). Many 
other jurisdictions allow the court to order a party to maintain 
life insurance in favor of a former spouse. See generally John J. 
Michalik, Annotation, Divorce: Provisions in Decree That One Party 
Obtain or Maintain Life Insurance For Benefit of Other Party or 
Child, 59 A.L.R. 9 (1974). In Gallo v. Gallo, 440 A.2d 782 (Conn. 
1981), the trial court ordered the defendant to purchase a life 
insurance policy with the plaintiff named as the beneficiary. The 
court explained: "Such and order is well within the inherent 
equitable power of the court in a dissolution proceeding." Id. at 
788 (citing Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 585, 362 
A.2d 835 (1975); and Thomas v. Thomas. 158 Conn. 477, 482-483, 271 
A.2d 62 (1970)). In response to the argument that life insurance 
policies represent an improper award of alimony continuing after 
the payor's death the court stated: "Insurance premiums are paid 
during a decedent's lifetime and the proceeds flow directly to the 
beneficiary. This is not analogous to a claim of continued payment 
of periodic alimony from the estate of the deceased ex-spouse." 
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Id, (citing Harrison v. Union & New Haven trust Co,. 147 Conn. 435, 
437, 162 A.2d 182 (1960) ) . See also Robbins v. Robbins. 453 N.E.2d 
1059, 1060 (Mass. App. 1983) ("It was within the judge's discretion 
to require the defendant to maintain a life insurance policy for 
the plaintiff's benefit."); and Moebus v. Moebus. 529 So.2d 1163 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming judgment ordering the husband 
to maintain a life insurance policy in favor of the wife to protect 
the wife's alimony). Colorado's courts have found that the health 
of the party ordered to pay spousal support is relevant to a 
decision ordering the party to maintain life insurance in favor of 
the former spouse. Koktavy, 612 P.2d at 1162. 
Even jurisdictions which disapprove of orders forcing the 
party to provide life insurance allow the parties to include a life 
insurance provision in their decree where the parties have agreed 
on the issue. The Menor court, when overruling an order forcing 
the husband to provide a life insurance policy in favor of his ex-
wife stated, "This situation is clearly distinguishable from those 
cases in which the parties to a divorce action have settled their 
property rights by contract, the terms of which are incorporated in 
the decree." 391 P.2d at 477. See also Koktavy, 612 P.2d at 1162 
(explaining that Colorado law allows parties to agree in writing 
that maintenance will continue after death). 
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The trial court's order conforms to the precedent outlined 
above. First, the parties agreed that Husband would maintain his 
life insurance. This agreement was not an agreement in writing, as 
required in Colorado, but was included in the record of the trial 
court. Second, there is significant support suggesting that 
maintaining Wife as the beneficiary of Husband's life insurance 
policy is not post mortem alimony. Third, as Husband admits, he is 
in poor health and the life insurance policy is an appropriate 
method to secure the alimony awarded to Wife. The trial court was 
well within its broad discretion when it approved Wife's motion and 
ordered Husband to maintain his life insurance policy with Wife as 
the named beneficiary. 
IV. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COST ON APPEAL 
Wife should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs of court 
in defending this appeal. The parties were divorced by an Amended 
Decree of Divorce and Amended Findings, entered on October 28, 
1992, after having been married 3 2 (thirty-two) years. The parties 
had three children and the Wife was a homemaker during the entire 
marriage and relied upon the Husband for her support and the 
support of the family. 
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Wife, the Appellee herein, cannot afford the costs and 
attorney's fees in defending the instant appeal and respectfully 
requests an award of fees and costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Trial courts have broad discretionary powers in divorce 
matters. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case 
where the record clearly indicated a stipulation between Husband 
and Wife that Husband would maintain his life insurance/Civil 
Survivor benefits with Wife as the beneficiary. The trial court 
was also well within its discretion when it modified the decree to 
correct a clerical error. Finally, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by ordering Husband to maintain the survivor 
benefits where significant precedent from other jurisdictions 
supports the order. For these reasons Wife respectfully requests 
that this court uphold the Third Judicial District Court's order 
requiring Husband to maintain the Civil Survivor benefits with Wife 
as the sole beneficiary and that the Wife be awarded her attorney's 
fees and all costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this / 7 ^ 7 X &*¥ o f April, 1993 
CELLIE F. WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Defendant/Wife 
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